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Abstract 
Mental state reasoning has been theorized as a core feature of how we navigate our social 
worlds, and as especially vital to moral reasoning. Judgments of moral wrong-doing and punish-
worthiness often hinge upon evaluations of the perpetrator’s mental states. In two studies, we 
examine how differences in cultural conceptions about how one should think about others’ minds 
influence the relative importance of intent vs. outcome in moral judgments. We recruit 
participation from three societies, differing in emphasis on mental state reasoning: Indigenous 
iTaukei Fijians from Yasawa Island (Yasawans) who normatively avoid mental state inference in 
favor of focus on relationships and consequences of actions; Indo-Fijians who normatively 
emphasize relationships but do not avoid mental state inference; and North Americans who 
emphasize individual autonomy and interpreting others’ behaviors as the direct result of mental 
states. In study 1, Yasawan participants placed more emphasis on outcome than Indo-Fijians or 
North Americans by judging accidents more harshly than failed attempts. Study 2 tested whether 
underlying differences in the salience of mental states drives study 1 effects by inducing 
Yasawan and North American participants to think about thoughts vs. actions before making 
moral judgments. When induced to think about thoughts, Yasawan participants shifted to judge 
failed attempts more harshly than accidents. Results suggest that culturally-transmitted concepts 
about how to interpret the social world shape patterns of moral judgments, possibly via mental 
state inference.  
Keywords 
Morality, mentalizing, theory of mind, cross-cultural comparisons, Opacity of Mind  
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1. Introduction 
In 2009, U.S. Army Private Bowe Bergdahl walked off of his post in Afghanistan and into 
a five-year-long period of captivity, held by the Taliban. His disappearance triggered a manhunt 
that cost huge amounts of time, resources, and even a few soldiers’ lives. Starting in late 2015, a 
year after Bergdahl’s return to American soil, his story became part of a pop-cultural 
phenomenon. Millions of people downloaded the podcast Serial (Koenig, 2015) to explore one 
main question: Is Bergdahl ultimately responsible for the outcome of his disappearance – the lost 
time, resources, and human lives – even if he did not intend such damage? 
That such a story became a pop-cultural hit should come as little surprise; as fundamentally 
social beings, we spend huge amounts of time figuring out how to interpret and respond to 
others’ actions. But in formulating our responses, how do we determine when someone has done 
wrong? How do we decide whether or not to punish? For many, the answer lies in focusing on 
perpetrator intent – we judge actions by thinking about the minds that produced them. For 
example, the core distinction between murder and manslaughter in the Western legal tradition is 
mens rea - criminal intent. To establish criminal intent beyond a shadow of a doubt, societies that 
follow these Western legal traditions consume substantial amounts of time and resources to 
prove that the perpetrator desired the outcome and believed their actions would create this effect. 
But the sources of evidence we rely on for intent vs. outcome are quite different. To establish 
that a murderous outcome occurred, all we need is a body. To establish who done it, we look to 
fingerprints, eye-witnesses, DNA evidence, and video footage. But for intent, we rely on 
inferences – indirect evidence from verbal statements and past behavior. However much it may 
sometimes feel like one can know another’s mind, we do not in fact have direct access; 
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intentions don’t leave fingerprints or footprints. How then can another person’s life ride on 
something so intangible? 
We suggest that the answer lies in cultural conceptions, the local ideas and beliefs, about 
what makes people tick. Judgments of both the permissibility and appropriate response to others’ 
behaviors are not mechanistic calculations made in isolation from the world around us. They are 
deeply informed by the social contexts we live in. In many populations with Western European 
roots, the prevailing belief is that minds and mental states cause behaviors (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). If the mind is the root of all evil, then mental states like intent are the most appropriate 
focus (Berman, 1999; Cohen & Rozin, 2001). By contrast, anthropological and historical records 
show many instances of societies who paid little or no attention to intention, even in situations 
like murder (Baker, 1979; Gluckman, 1965; 1972; Kroeber, 1976). Of particular note, 
ethnographers working around the Pacific, in some Central American communities, and in parts 
of the Arctic have noted a general avoidance of discussion about mental states (Duranti, 2015; 
Luhrmann, 2011; Robbins & Rumsey, 2008; Throop, 2012). When pressed to say why they do 
not talk about what is going on in other people’s heads, people in these communities often 
describe the mind as inside an opaque container. One can never truly know what another is 
thinking. Ethnographers dubbed these beliefs about minds the Opacity Doctrine or Opacity of 
Mind (Duranti, 2015; Luhrmann, 2011; Robbins & Rumsey, 2008; Throop, 2012).  
Complementing this historical and ethnographic evidence, a recent but growing body of 
psychological findings demonstrates cultural variation in the importance of mental state 
attribution in general, and within the context of intent reasoning for moral judgments in 
particular. Societies that place greater emphasis on communal and relational values often focus 
less on intent (Barrett et al., 2016; Hamilton et al., 1983; Laurin & Plaks, 2014), with 
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implications for how people broadcast their thought processes through behaviors like emotional 
displays (Lillard, 1998; Matsumoto, Takeuchi, Andayani, Kouznetsova, & Krupp, 1998; 
Matsumoto et al., 2008). Developmentally, children living in more traditional and community-
oriented groups often pass psychological tests that require them to use others’ beliefs to predict 
their behavior (i.e. false belief measures) at later ages (Barrett, Broesch, Scott, He, Baillargeon, 
Di Wu, et al., 2013a; Callaghan et al., 2005; Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008; Mayer & 
Trauble, 2012). This is particularly so for children from cultural contexts with Opacity of Mind 
norms (Barrett, Broesch, Scott, He, Baillargeon, Di Wu, et al., 2013a; Mayer & Trauble, 2012). 
This suggests a weaker, more distant cognitive/semantic connection between thoughts and 
behaviors for children in these societies. Conversely, exposure to a larger lexicon of mental state 
terms and more formal Western education predicts children will perform these tasks at younger 
ages (Meristo et al., 2007; Pyers & Senghas, 2009; Vinden, 2002). This suggests a tighter linkage 
between mental states and behaviors, and further implies more emphasis on intention for judging 
behavior.  
Here, we focus on comparisons across four samples: two from Fiji and two from North 
America. From Fiji, we recruit participants from small, rural communities of Indigenous iTaukei1 
Fijians, known to follow Opacity of Mind norms (Barrett et al., 2016).2 We also recruit 
participation from Indo-Fijians, or Fijians of Indian descent, whose ancestors arrived in Fiji 
about a century ago and who favor a socio-centric, relational view of people, but without Opacity 
of Mind norms (Barr, 2003; Kelly, 1988; Willard, 2017; Wilson, 1975). Our North American 
                                                 
1 iTaukei is the term that Indigenous Fijians identify themselves with. The literal English translation is “owner/ 
native.” The term reflects the deep connection between land and identity within Indigenous iTaukei Fijian culture. 
2 Prior work suggests iTaukei Fijians are less inclined to use mental state information to predict actors’ behaviors 
and less likely to think about others in terms of mental states, potentially due to this cultural context of  Opacity of 
Mind norms ( McNamara, Willard, & Henrich, n.d.). A copy of this manuscript is available from the authors upon 
request. 
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samples include Canadian university students and American non-student adults, who represent 
the typical populations used in the vast majority of social and developmental studies in 
psychology (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Nielsen, Haun, Kärtner, & Legare, 2017) and 
who, more importantly, hold to Western notions of the mind as the origin of behavior and 
individual autonomy. 
1.1. Accidents and Failed Attempts: Mentalistic vs. Consequentialist Judgements of 
Permissibility and Punishment 
In the present research, we treat moral reasoning as a subset of general reasoning about 
social norms. We take social norms to be the set of local rules and expectations that are learned 
socially; they are often widely known within a particular community but may not be formally 
codified or necessarily explicitly stated (Gelfand & Jackson, 2016; Kimbrough & Vostroknutov, 
2013; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013; Sripada & Stich, 2006). Using this normative definition of 
morality, we focus on the pattern of judgments made around whatever an individual has deemed 
to be a violation (B. Gert & Gert, 2016). 
Moral concerns are both likely to be judged as more wrong and more likely to be evaluated 
using mental state reasoning than non-moral ones among WEIRD people (Giffin & Lombrozo, 
2017). There is some evidence that judgments about permissibility (how bad an action was) and 
punish-worthiness (how much punishment an action deserves) are driven by two distinct 
processes: a ‘whodunit’ process and a ‘did they meant to’ process. The ‘whodunit’ process 
mirrors the demands for physical evidence in establishing criminal outcome: it evaluates causal 
attributions of responsibility and violation severity (i.e. big infractions vs. tiny slip-ups). The ‘did 
they mean to’ process, on the other hand, mirrors criminal intent by operating on less physically-
tangible mental state information (Cushman, 2008; 2015; Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & 
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Carey, 2013). In North American samples, judgments of wrongdoing are scaled almost 
exclusively by the ‘did they mean to,’ intent-oriented mental state reasoning process, while 
judgments about punish-worthiness are scaled by the degree of severity calculated by the more 
mind-blind ‘whodunnit’ process (though scope of punishment can be scaled by intent; see: 
Cushman, 2008; Cushman et al., 2013; Martin & Cushman, 2015). Because these processes do 
not perfectly overlap, mis-matches in intent and outcome (i.e. an accident that results in a bad 
outcome despite a positive or neutral intent) can receive more severe reactions than would be 
expected in a strictly intent-focused system (Costa, 2009; Martin & Cushman, 2015). 
1.2. Cultural Conceptions of Mind Shape Moral Reasoning 
Looking broadly across societies, groups with greater emphasis on communal values 
exhibit a range of behaviors that focus on maintaining relational spaces. Emphasis on community 
is associated with lower tolerance of norm violations in general (Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006; 
Hofstede, 1983; Kim & Markus, 1999; Phelan & Rudman, 2010). These deviations from the 
norms may present a real, tangible threat to survival for those who rely on family and 
interpersonal networks as informal insurance in societies with high levels of existential insecurity 
and poor secular institutions to mitigate this existential threat (Bollig, 2006; De Weerdt & 
Dercon, 2006; Fincher & Thornhill, 2012; Kaplan & Gurven, 2005). Similarly, community-
oriented, collectivistic groups tend to emphasize behavioral domains that support community 
integrity (Graham et al., 2011; Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; 
Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). Other studies contrasting highly-individualistic, 
American samples against more urbanized but collectivistic people in Japan and India show that 
these more collectivistic societies also focus less on intent (Hamilton et al., 1983; Laurin & 
Plaks, 2014). Even among American samples, the purity domain of morality (see: Graham et al., 
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2011) is less likely than other domains to be judged based upon intent (Barrett et al., 2016; 
Young & Saxe, 2011; Young & Tsoi, 2013). Linking back to the prevalence of Opacity of Mind 
norms in the Pacific, many Pacific societies emphasize the importance of maintaining the 
integrity of relationships as a core value and central organizing principle for determining social 
actions. For example, the Samoan concept of teu le va, or the space between people, is a central 
focus for many Samoans when determining correct actions (Anae, 2010; Mila-Schaaf, 2006). We 
argue it is no coincidence that, as a society with strong Opacity of Mind norms, many Samoans 
also focus on consequences and emphasize damage to relationships resulting from violations – 
regardless of intent (Duranti, 2015).  
1.3. Overview of Studies 
While existing cross-cultural work outlined above points to some interesting patterns, it 
frequently relies on broad individualistic vs. collectivistic comparisons. The present work 
underscores the importance of differing cultural content in beliefs and norms about the mind, in 
addition to broad cultural orientations to the self-concept such as individualism-collectivism. Our 
contrast between two populations in Fiji provides us this opportunity. Both iTaukei and Indo-
Fijians are collectivistic, in the sense that both favor a more relational model of self than is 
typical in Western populations (Brison, 2001; Gervais, 2013; Kelly, 1988; Kline, Boyd, & 
Henrich, 2013). Both iTaukei and Indo-Fijians live within the same wider institutional 
environment of Fijian governance, and both typically adhere to hierarchically-structured social 
roles. However, they have different norms about how and whether one can or should try to know 
the mind of another person. By linking individual judgments to group-level social norms, we can 
begin to unpack the processes that lead to cultural differences and examine how culturally-
transmitted beliefs impact underlying cognition. 
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Study 1 maps out the judgment patterns reported by our Yasawan, Indo-Fijian, and North 
American participants. If being focused on community rather than individual status matters most 
in influencing moral reasoning, then we predict Yasawans and Indo-Fijian participants will judge 
negative intent less harshly than North Americans (Hamilton et al., 1983; Laurin & Plaks, 2014). 
However, if specific models of minds beyond individualism/ collectivism influence moral 
judgments, then we predict that Yasawans (with their context of Opacity of Mind norms that 
discourage mental state discussion) will show less emphasis on intention compared to both North 
Americans and Indo-Fijians. Further, we predict Yasawans will judge negative outcomes more 
harshly than both other groups, again due to of Opacity of Mind norms that favor behavioral 
rather than mentalistic inference.  
Study 2 further isolates differences in thinking about minds as a potential mechanism 
driving cross-cultural differences in judgments based upon intent. Two additional samples, one 
from Yasawans and one from North American, judged moral violations after first being induced 
to think about thoughts versus actions of God. We presented this thought salience manipulation 
within this supernatural framing context because of God’s relevance and familiarity in both 
samples. We predict that, when thoughts are salient, participants should judge violations 
motivated by negative intent more harshly. Importantly, if observed cross-cultural differences in 
intent focus are more related to differences in underlying tendency to think about minds as a 
primary explanation for behaviors, then making thoughts salient should shift Yasawans to judge 
negative intent just as harshly as other populations without Opacity of Mind norms. 
We report how we determined sample sizes, all data exclusions, and all measures 
completed by participants in the article and in the accompanying Supplemental Materials. All de-
identified data for the analyses reported here are publicly available (McNamara, 2017). 
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1.4. Field Sites: Yasawa and Lovu Village, Fiji 
Fiji is home to two main ethnic groups: Indigenous iTaukei Fijians and Indo-Fijians. 
Comparisons between iTaukei and Indo-Fijians are particularly illuminating in that they share 
the larger country-level institutional structures, geographic isolation, climate, weather-shocks, 
and pathogens, but come from distinct, non-Western cultural traditions. In this section, we 
briefly sketch the ethnographic details about the sites where our iTaukei Fijian participants live 
on Yasawa Island (hereafter referred to as Yasawans), and where our Indo-Fijian participants 
live on the main island of Viti Levu.  
1.4.1. Yasawa Island 
The people of Yasawa, Fiji, live as traditional fisher horticulturalists in small villages of 
around 70-150 adults. Village life revolves around the traditional political hierarchy that 
culminates in a hereditary chief and structures social networks around kinship. These kinship ties 
organize the vast majority of the cooperative and coordinated efforts that Yasawans rely on for 
daily survival; these cooperative tasks range from sharing food to building houses (McNamara & 
Henrich, 2017; Nayacakalou, 1955; 1957). This kinship hierarchy also defines the traditional 
practices and norms that foster a more relational, socially-defined sense of self common among 
iTaukei Fijians (Brison, 2001; Rumsey, 2000).  
Keeping tradition alive is often also associated with basic iTaukei Fijian political and 
interpersonal identity (France, 1969; Jolly, 1992). The traditional norms of particular importance 
for this study revolve around the idea that other minds are fundamentally unknowable, invisible 
behind the opaque barrier of social obligations and improper fodder for conversation, as one’s 
thoughts are an individuals’ private business. Previous research suggests Yasawans may focus 
less on intent than other small-scale, traditional, non-Western societies (Barrett et al., 2016).  
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iTaukei Fijian norms that lead to treating minds as opaque may arise from a number of 
different sources. Because traditional iTaukei Fijian life includes deep interdependence on family 
ties, mental states may not be considered an appropriate excuse in the case of social harm. That a 
person who failed in a social obligation did so without meaning to cause harm may be irrelevant 
because the stakes are high and many other relationships are damaged by their shortcoming. This 
appears to be the case in documented traditional legal proceedings to settle disputes in Samoa 
(Duranti, 2015). On the other hand, there may be a general reluctance to believe that people can 
indeed commit accidents – perhaps there is some deeper belief that, when a person does 
something, there may be some spiritual or hidden (in psychology terms, unconscious) rationale 
driving their actions. This skepticism toward mistaken knowledge appears in ethnographies of 
Opacity of Mind norms in Mayan Mexico, where people classify mistakes and deliberate 
deception in the same category, ‘deception’ (Luhrmann, 2011). In Yasawa, beliefs about sorcery/ 
witchcraft that may result in illness or death among community members similarly hints at a 
general belief that even uncontrollable events are somehow linked to hidden intention states of 
humans in the social networks around them.  
1.4.2. Lovu Village, Viti Levu 
Indo-Fijians are a diaspora population brought by the British as indentured labor between 
1879 and 1912 (Gillion, 1962). Today, Indo-Fijians live mostly in and around Fiji’s larger cities 
and work as wage laborers or sugar cane farmers. Indo-Fijians are primarily Hindu or Muslim, 
with a minority of Sikhs and Christian converts. Like the iTaukei, Indo-Fijians have strong 
family ties and frequently rely on their kin-based networks for help in times of need (Lal, 1992). 
Though the caste system has been largely abolished in this community, a strong sense of 
hierarchy still exists (Brown, 1981). In the absence of the caste system, some of this hierarchy is 
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maintained though ritual purity and the ‘goodness’ of members of the Indo community, requiring 
substantial attention to be paid to understanding the mental states of others (Trkna, 2012). Most 
of our Indo-Fijian participants lived in Lovu village near Lautoka, though several were recruited 
from nearby Nadi and Ba. 
2. Study 1: Differences in Moral Judgments Across Societies 
Building on prior vignette-based, cross-cultural studies of intent focus in moral reasoning 
that used accidental vs. intentional violations (Barrett et al., 2016; Laurin & Plaks, 2014), we 
examine intent vs. outcome by adding failed attempts, which allow us to examine whether 
participants think bad intent or bad outcome is worse. If failed attempts are judged more harshly 
than accidents, then a bad intention – even if the outcome is positive – is in-and-of-itself 
intolerable. Harsher judgments of failed attempts therefore signify emphasis on mental state 
inference for interpreting behavior. If accidents are judged more harshly, then a bad outcome will 
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Table 1 Total sample participant numbers with demographics by sample. 
Yasawans and Indo-Fijians were recruited in their homes by iTaukei and Indo-Fijian 
research assistants respectively and participated voluntarily based upon availability. Of the 561 
North American participants, 203 were Canadian university students who were recruited through 
the university’s human subjects pool and remunerated with course credit. The remaining 358 
were adults from the United States recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mturk). 
Sample sizes for Yasawa were heavily constrained by small population sizes within participating 
villages; we targeted recruitment with the goal of having approx. 30 observations per intent 
condition and violation domain. We recruited Indo-Fijian and North American participants with 
the goal of having adequate sample sizes to run structural equation models on additional mind 
perception scales.3 G*Power analysis indicated that this sample size should be powered (80%) to 
detect effect sizes of d = 0.03 and larger (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009).4 Full details 
of study 1 recruitment phases, site-specific procedural variations, and recruitment numbers are 
provided in the online supplement (sections S.M.4. & S1.1.). 
                                                 
3 These scales are that are described in (Willard & McNamara, n.d.). A copy of this manuscript is available from the 
authors upon request. 
4 Barrett et al. (2016) recruited a total sample size of 322, with 66 participants in Yasawa. 
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2.1.2. Materials 
2.1.2.1. Moral Violation Vignettes: Manipulate Intent and Outcome 
Our moral violation vignettes vary positive vs. negative intent and positive vs. negative 
outcome, as summarized in the Table 2 intent/ outcome matrix (Young, Cushman, Hauser, & 
Saxe, 2007; Young, Scholz, & Saxe, 2011).  
Outcome 
 Intent  
 Positive Negative  











Table 2 Intent/ Outcome Matrix for Intent conditions. Endorsements of stronger punishments 
against failed attempts indicate intent focus; stronger punishments of accidental violations 
indicate outcome focus. 
Vignettes depict six domains of moral norm violations: (1) harm, (2) theft, (3) poisoning, 
(4) food taboos, (5) social taboos, and (6) failed cooperation.5 For the present analysis, we 
examine the average intent/ outcome focus across domains (see online supplement section S1.7., 
S1.8., & S1.9. for detailed intent condition by domain by sample analysis).6 Materials were 
modified for all samples to reflect culturally appropriate names and moral taboo content (e.g. 
                                                 
5 Story contents for harm, theft, poison, and food taboo domain vignettes were adapted from materials used in 
(Barrett et al., 2016). See online supplement section S.M.1. for sample vignettes. 
6 We examine the effect of intent condition on each domain of violation for each sample and find that the overall 
pattern of intent vs. outcome focus holds within sample across all domains. One may wonder if asking about God 
may serve as an extra mentalizing prime. However, this should be mitigated by the manipulation check questions 
that ask participants to use mentalizing to infer the opinions of the victim and of third parties. Nonetheless, we 
account for the possibility that asking questions about God influenced the results with a control variable tracking 
whether they were asked about God or not. Participants who were asked about God did not significantly differ from 
those who were not asked about God, but we keep the control variable in for the results reported here. 
Running Head: WEIGHING OUTCOME VS. INTENT ACROSS SOCIETIES  15 
food taboo for Yasawans = eating shark; Indo-Fijians = vegetarian eating meat, and North 
Americans = a man who keeps Kosher eating pork).  
If Opacity of Mind norms suppress mental state inference, Yasawans might not infer them 
to the same extent as other samples, or they may make very different inferences. Our vignettes 
provide explicit information about perpetrator mental states (their knowledge, beliefs, and/ or 
desires) and victim outcome. This helps ensure that observed differences in judgments are based 
on different emphasis on intent vs. outcome, rather than different inferences of what the 
intentions or outcomes were. We also obtain ratings of intentionality to ensure these 
manipulations worked as anticipated. 
2.1.2.2. Judgment Measures 
Following the vignettes, participants provided their judgments on a -2 (most negative/ 
intentional/ worthy of punishment) to +2 (most by positive/ accidental/ worthy of reward) likert 
scale, which were adapted from Barrett et. al. (2016). All participants answered judgment 
questions in the same order: (1) Good/ Bad, (2) Purpose/ Accident, (3) Positive/ Negative, (4) 
Pleased/ Angered, (5) Other Opinion Good/ Bad and (6) Reward/ Punish. 
2.1.2.2.1 Dependent Variables: Permissibility and Punishment/ Reward 
We have two focal dependent variables: 1) Permissibility (Good/ Bad: “How good or bad 
was what [perpetrator] did?”) and 2) Punishment/ Reward (Reward/ Punish: “In your opinion, do 
you think [perpetrator] should be rewarded or punished?”).  
2.1.2.2.2 Manipulation Checks 
To assess how participants interpreted our vignettes, we use four manipulation checks:  
 Intent = Purpose/ Accident: “Did [perpetrator] do [action] on purpose or by accident?” 
 Outcome = Positive/ Negative: “How positively or negatively was [victim] affected?” 
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 Victim Response = Pleased/ Angered: “Do you think [victim] was pleased or angered by 
what happened?” 
 Reputation = Other Opinion Good/ Bad: “When people discover what happened, what will 
people think of [perpetrator] ­ will they think he is a good person or a bad person?” 
Both intent and outcome manipulation checks show that participants in all samples saw 
intentional and failed attempt violations as more intentional and negative outcomes as worse 
(See supplement S1.4.). Notably, Yasawans rated the intent of accidents and no violation 
conditions equally (bAccidents-No Violation = 0.01, CI.95 [-0.22, 0.24], p = 0.92); as less intentional 
than both failed attempts (bAccidents-Failed Attempts = -0.56, CI.95 [-0.79, -0.34], p < 0.001) and 
intentional violations (bAccidents- Intentional = -1.01, CI.95 [-1.22, -0.79], p < 0.001); and as neither on 
purpose or by accident (bAccidents = -0.09, CI.95 [-0.34, 0.16], p = 0.49). However, because the 
other two samples rate accidents as more accidental, the result is that Yasawans do rate accidents 
as significantly less accidental than the other two groups (bYasawa-Indo-Fijians = 1.23, CI.95 [1.02, 
1.46], p < 0.001; bYasawa-North American = 1.10, CI.95 [0.91, 1.29], p < 0.001). Indo-Fijians also rate 
the no violation conditions as intentional (bNo Violation = -1.17, CI.95 [-1.31, -1.02], p < 0.001) and 
the outcome of accidents as positive (bAccidents = 0.31, CI.95 [0.04, 0.57], p = 0.03), though they 
do rate the outcome of intentional violations as worse than failed attempts and no violation 
conditions (bIntentional-Failed Attempts = 0.28, CI.95 [0.09, 0.47], p = 0.004; bIntentional-No Violation = 0.45, 
CI.95 [0.26, 0.64], p < 0.001). Victim Response and Reputation questions, participants had to 
mentalize other people’s reactions. All samples report that the victim will be more angered when 
the outcome is negative. For the perpetrator’s reputation, Yasawans and North Americans expect 
other people’s judgments to be about the same as their own. For the Reputation manipulation 
check question, Indo-Fijians rated others’ opinions of the perpetrator to be more like iTaukei 
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judgements, which may suggest they interpreted ‘other people’ as iTaukei (See supplement 
S1.5.). 
2.1.3. Procedure 
Participants in all samples followed the same basic procedure: they listened to or read a 
vignette, then answered questions about the vignette. This was repeated for four vignettes. 
Domains of moral violation (e.g. harm, theft, taboo) were crossed with intention conditions and 
counterbalanced across participants. Following each vignette, participants answered the six 
judgment questions followed by an open-ended question about what they think of the violation to 
capture anything participants wanted to say that they felt they did not communicate through the 
judgment questions.  
2.2. Results 
Previous research suggests intent plays a distinct role in judging permissibility vs. punish-
worthiness (Cushman, 2008; 2015). We begin our analysis with two models, one each on 
participants’ ratings of how permissible (Good/ Bad) and how worthy of reward or punishment 
(Reward/ Punish) the action was. We account for the repeated judgments using multilevel 
modeling with random intercepts for participants, fit in R (R Development Core Team, 2008) 
using the lme4 (Bates et al., 2014) and lmerTest (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2014) 
packages. We test whether each population reacted to each condition differently by adding an 
interaction between sample and condition. We include controls for violation domain and whether 
participants were asked about God or not. We include demographic variables of sex, age, and 
years of formal education to all of the models, though these variables never produce significant 
effects (supplement section S1.6.). We report cross-society comparisons using raw scores, but 
see supplement section S1.2 for comparison with standardized moral judgment ratings.  
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2.2.1. Permissibility and Punish-worthiness Across Intent Conditions 
As shown in Figure 1, samples responded to intent conditions significantly differently for 
both permissibility and punish-worthiness ratings. Contrasted mean comparisons in Table 3 show 
Yasawans make the harshest judgments against accidents. Using our -2 (extremely bad/ highly 
punished) to +2 (extremely good/ highly rewarded) scales, Yasawans rate failed attempts as 
better than accidents; failed attempts were rated as 0.20 of a point more permissible (bAccidents-
Failed Attempts = 0.20, CI.95 [0.01, 0.38], p = 0.04) and 0.15 of a point less punish-worthy (bAccidents-
Failed Attempts = 0.15, CI.95 [0.00, 0.30], p = 0.057). By contrast, both the North Americans and 
Indo-Fijians rate failed attempts as significantly less permissible and more punish-worthy than 
accidents. Not only are Yasawans treating accidents – bad outcomes without bad intentions – as 
comparatively worse than failed attempts while other samples do not; their emphasis on 
accidents over failed attempts suggests Yasawans are placing more weight on outcome overall. 
Importantly, though, Yasawans rate successful intentional violations as 0.29 of a point less 
permissible (bAccidents-Intentional = -0.29, CI.95 [-0.47, -0.12], p = 0.001) and 0.39 of a point more 
punish-worthy (bAccidents-Intentional = -0.39, CI.95 [-0.53, -0.25], p < 0.001) than accidents. While 
Yasawans rate a bad outcome despite a neutral intention as worse than bad intention with a 
neutral outcome, they rate a bad intention and a bad outcome as worse than either in isolation. 
Taken together, this suggests that Yasawans are attending to intent, but are more focused on 
outcome than the other samples.   
                                                 
7 Running these models with random slopes for society produces slightly smaller estimates for accidents vs. 
failed attempts in the reward/ punish question: b = 0.14, .95CI[-0.01, 0.30], p = 0.067. The presence of a true 
difference between these two intent conditions for Yasawans in reward/ punishment should be taken with caution. 
See online supplement section S1.3. 




Figure 1  Mean ratings of Permissibility and Punish-worthiness DVs by Sample and Intent 









































"How good or bad was what [perp.] did?"



























































"Do you think [perp.] should be rewarded or punished?"
No Violation Accident Failed Attempt Intentional
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Significance codes:  ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05,  †<0.1 
Table 3 Permissibility and punish-worthiness ratings of accidents vs. other intent conditions by sample and contrasted mean sample 
ratings by intent condition. Negative values indicate less permissible and more punish-worthy. Profile Likelihood CI. SE and df 
approximated using Satterthwaite approximation. Note: outcomes are subjective judgments; cross-society comparisons should be 
interpreted with caution as subjective judgments cannot dissociate potential effects of response style. 
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2.3. Discussion 
In line with previous work showing that Yasawans focus less on intent than other 
populations (Barrett et al., 2016), Yasawans rate accidents – positive intentions with negative 
outcomes – as both worse and worthy of more punishment than do Indo-Fijians and North 
Americans. While previous work has focused on the ways people in diverse, small-scale 
societies factor in intent or mitigating circumstances when judging moral violations, we focus 
here on whether participants make judgments based on mental state information (intent) or 
situational results (outcomes) of actions. The current data further extends previous research in 
aiming to pinpoint specific norms that might produce these cross-societal differences. If Opacity 
of Mind norms in Yasawa lead to focus on actions to the exclusion of mental states, then 
accidents should be treated more harshly than failed attempts and as harshly as intentional 
violations. Our analysis shows that Yasawan participants did rate the bad outcomes in accidents 
as less permissible and more punish-worthy than the bad intent of failed attempts, Yasawans are 
not strictly evaluating based on outcomes. Yasawans still treat intentional violations as worse 
than either intent or outcome in isolation, which suggests that Yasawans are including intent in 
their judgments, but placing more emphasis on outcome. 
North Americans placed far more weight on intent – so much so that our North American 
participants even rated failed attempts as equal to successful intentional violations. This is a 
striking finding that differs from explicit Western legal code. In this case, it may provide further 
evidence of the intensively mentalistic focus in North America – intent is far more important 
than outcome. Other work similarly suggests North Americans may be especially focused on 
intent. For example, North Americans may judge failed attempts more harshly if the violation 
was intended but never happened than if it did happen by other means (Cushman, 2008; 2015).  
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Overall, our pattern of results may indicate Indigenous iTaukei Fijian Opacity of Mind 
norms might highlight outcomes, while the mind-focused conception of the relationship between 
mind and behavior in North America may heavily emphasize intent. However, as it stands, we do 
not specifically pin-point differences in thinking about minds as the source of these cultural 
differences. To test whether the observed differences in intent vs. outcome focus in Yasawa and 
North America are due to our hypothesized underlying differences focus on internal mental 
states, study 2 explicitly manipulates the salience of thinking about thoughts vs. actions.  
3. Study 2: Manipulating Thought vs. Action Salience 
In study 2, we examine one mechanism that may drive the cross-sample differences in 
study 1: focus on internal thoughts vs. external behaviors. To test this, we manipulate the 
salience of thoughts vs. actions before participants make moral judgments. We propose that this 
induction to think about thoughts will preferentially boost focus on thoughts, therefore leading to 
harsher judgments of negative intent. Conversely, our induction to think about actions should 
boost activation of thoughts about behaviors, leading to harsher judgments of negative outcomes. 
We propose that the reason why Yasawans judge accidents more harshly than failed 
attempts in Study 1 is due to Opacity of Mind norms that downplay mental state discussion. Less 
discussion of minds as the underlying causes of behavior may lead Yasawans to think about 
thoughts less overall, therefore making the mentalistic reaction to behavior via intention less 
salient as well. If this is the case, then experimental reminders to think about thoughts should 
increase the salience of thoughts as important drivers of behavior, therefore increasing the 
harshness of their judgments about negative intent. This may be especially obvious in failed 
attempts (as intentional successful violations still conflate negative intent and negative outcome). 
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Similarly, if North Americans are habitually not taking the situation into account and over-
emphasizing mind, then reminders of actions should promote outcome focus.  
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
For study 2, we recruited 72 Yasawan villagers from May-June 2014 and 132 Canadians 
from January to June 2015 (see Table 4). Yasawans participated over repeated, short (15-20 
minute) sessions using the same recruitment method as Study 1. Canadian university students 
studying psychology were remunerated with course credit. One hundred twenty-one Canadian 
student participants completed study materials in the lab administered by a fellow university 
student working as a research assistant; a further 11 participated online. 
 Participants 
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94 Religious: 67 
 Abrahamic: 40 
 Non-Abrahamic: 27 
 
Non-Religious: 58 
 Atheist: 20 
 Agnostic: 15 
 None: 23 






Table 4 Study 2 sample demographics  
As with study 1, Yasawa sample size was heavily constrained by small village populations. 
Recruitment was similarly targeted with the goal of approx. 30 observations per intent condition 
and thought vs. action prime combination. We used the same logic to recruit our Canadian 
student sample, targeting approx. 30 observations per intent and prime combination. We needed 
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nearly twice the sample size for the students due to differences in the site-specific procedures 
(detailed in Figure 2 and section 3.1.3. below).  
3.1.2. Materials 
We use the same norm violation vignettes from Study 1, but we only use poisoning a water 
source, theft, violating a social taboo, and failures in cooperation. We also introduce a salience 
manipulation to induce participants to think about thoughts (Thought Prime) or think about 
actions (Action Prime) before considering each vignette. We couch primes within a question 
about supernatural agents: What do these agents want and not want people to think or do?8 
For our Thought Prime, we ask participants to list up to 5 examples of thoughts God would 
or would not want them to think, whether God can reward or punish them for these thoughts, and 
(if they answered yes to possible reward or punishment) what kinds of rewards or punishments 
they might receive. Our Action Prime used the same wording but asked about what actions God 
would or would not want them to do, if they could be rewarded or punished, and what those 
punishments or rewards might be. Because both the Thought and Action primes include positive 
(desirable/ reward-worthy) and negative (undesirable/ punishment-worthy) elements, we asked 
about the positive and negative thoughts or actions as separate questions presented in 
counterbalanced order. For both samples, the primes were administered within subject, such that 
all participants were primed with both the Thought and Action primes. For example: participant 
                                                 
8 We use this religious framing in our primes because they were relevant to both populations. Our ongoing research 
with these Fijian communities often involves interviews about supernatural and religious beliefs. Because these 
participants know we are interested in what they believe God or local spirits want, this framing is less likely to 
arouse suspicion and provides additional information for our separate but related projects on religious belief. As the 
results in supplementary Table S12 show, asking Yasawan participants about God’s judgments in study 1 did not 
increase their ratings of how much they saw violations as intentional. If anything, asking about God lead to non-
significant decreases in intent ratings – Yasawans who were asked about God’s opinions tended to rate violations as 
slightly more by accident than those who were not asked about God’s opinions. Analyses in supplement section 
S2.2. show that Canadian participants in study 2 who believe in God did not significantly differ from non-believers.  
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A might answer about thoughts God would want (positive), thoughts God would not want 
(negative), then judge a violation vignette. Next, participant A might answer about actions God 
would not want (negative), actions God would want (positive), then judge a second vignette. 
Yasawans answered one Thought prime and one Action prime for the Christian God and a 
second Thought prime and Action Prime for local ancestor spirits in counterbalanced order. The 
Christian God is typically concerned about moral affairs beyond local norms; the local ancestor 
spirits care more about respect for traditional village norms (McNamara & Henrich, 2018). North 
Americans only answered one Thought prime and one Action prime for whatever entity they 
thought of as ‘God.’ 
3.1.3. Procedure 
Procedures for each site are depicted in Figure 2 Site-specific procedures for study 2. and 
supplement section S2.1. Yasawans participated in 4 sessions, each separated by approx. 24 
hours. Each session featured one primed vignette, for a total of 2 Thought primed judgments and 
2 Action primed judgments. Participants responded to 1 intentional, 1 accidental, 1 failed 
attempt, and 1 no violation vignette. Participants later answered questions about God, humans, 
and local ancestor spirits mental capacities in a fifth session. All materials were counterbalanced 
order. Each session lasted approx. 20 minutes. 
Canadian students participated in one, approx. 60-minute session with 2 primed judgments. 
Primes were presented in counterbalanced order. Judgments were separated by a distractor task 
asking participants to view 8 neutral images and list up to 5 words or phrases to describe each. 
After the second judgment, participants answered questions about human and divine mental 
capacities, mentalizing abilities (EQ short: Wakabayashi et al., 2006), and demographics.  
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Figure 2 Site-specific procedures for study 2. Thought & Action Primes were counterbalanced 
for both samples.  
Yasawa
(5 phases, 4-5 days, ~15 min/ session)
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3.2. Results 
Our analysis of study 2 parallels study 1, except that we add interactions to test for possible 
priming effects. We again use two separate models to analyze permissibility and punish-
worthiness ratings as our two primary dependent variables (see supplement sections S2.4. and 
S2.5. for manipulation check analyses). We account for multiple observations using multilevel 
linear regression with random intercepts for participants. As with our test for whether samples 
reacted to intent conditions with an interaction in study 1, we again add this interaction in study 
2. We further test whether a difference in effect of intent conditions for each sample differed by 
prime with an interaction between sample, intention condition, and prime. We also include 
controls for violation domain (with poison as the reference domain), how much the participant 
reported they thought the perpetrator intended to perform the action, the order each vignette was 
observed in, and whether North American participants said they believe in God or not (see 
supplement section S2.2.). We do not find a significant difference in how Yasawans responded 
to primes asking about the Christian God or the local ancestor spirits (prime x intent condition x 
supernatural agent F(3, 265) = 0.21, p = 0.88), so we collapse them together for this analysis. 
Multilevel models are fit in R (R Development Core Team, 2008) using the lme4 (Bates et al., 
2014) and lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al., 2014) packages.  
3.2.1. Priming Effects on Badness and Punishment Across Intent Conditions 
Figure 3 illustrates that the primes had the strongest impact in Yasawa, with the biggest 
differences emerging in Yasawans’ ratings of failed attempts. Yasawans rate failed attempts as 
0.76 of a point less permissible when reminded of Thoughts rather than Actions (bAction Prime – 
Thought Prime = -0.76, CI.95 [-1.20, -0.32], p = 0.001) and nearly a full point more worthy of 
punishment (bAction Prime – Thought Prime = -0.97, CI.95 [-1.33, -0.60], p < 0.001). But the prime did 
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not have a significant effect on either permissibility or punish-worthiness for accidents. Despite 
this lack of noticeable priming effect on accidents alone, Yasawans do still favor outcome in 
their judgments when primed with actions. The contrasted means in Table 5 show that, primed 
with actions, Yasawans rate accidents as 0.51 of a point less permissible than failed attempts 
(bAccidents-Failed Attempts = 0.51, CI.95 [0.07, 0.94], p = 0.03), though the Action Prime did not 
produce a difference in punish-worthiness ratings between accidents and failed attempts 
(bAccidents-Failed Attempts = 0.06, CI.95 [-0.32, 0.45], p = 0.75). The Thought Prime also lead 
Yasawans to rate failed attempts as 0.65 of a point more deserving of punishment than accidents 
(bAccidents-Failed Attempts = -0.65, CI.95 [-1.14, -0.26], p = 0.002). Yasawans also rate failed attempts 
as 0.37 of a point less permissible than accidents after being primed to think about thoughts, but 
this difference failed to reach conventional significance (bAccidents-Failed Attempts = -0.37, CI.95 [-
0.81, 0.08], p = 0.11)—although based on the CI most of the probability mass favors a positive 
effect. Yasawans continue to rate intentional violations as the worst in both primes, suggesting 
that the primes are most effective in intensifying Yasawan’s focus on intent without suppressing 
their focus on outcome. North Americans continue to be focused on intent with both primes for 
permissibility and punish-worthiness.  
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Figure 3 Mean ratings of Permissibility and Punish-worthiness DVs for Primes by Sample and 

































































































































































































































Running Head: WEIGHING OUTCOME VS. INTENT ACROSS SOCIETIES  30 
 Thought Action 
 












































































































































F (dfnum, dfdenom) 
Reward/ Punish 
F (dfnum, dfdenom) 
 
Sample x Prime 2.47 (1, 508) 3.05† (1, 387.76)  
Sample x Intent Condition 12.55*** (3, 508) 23.73*** (3, 452.24)   
Intent Condition x Prime 1.43 (3, 508) 2.26† (3, 492.07)  
Sample x Intent Condition x Prime 2.94* (3, 508) 1.94 (3, 492.85)   
Significance codes:  ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05,  †<0.1  
Table 5 Study 2 Permissibility and punish-worthiness ratings of accidents vs. other intent conditions by sample and prime with 
contrasted mean sample ratings by intent condition and prime. Negative values indicate less permissible and more punish-worthy. 
Profile Likelihood CI. SE and df approximated using Satterthwaite approximation. Numbers in table are calculated as differences 
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between relevant sample estimates. Note: outcomes are subjective judgments; cross-society comparisons should be interpreted with 
caution as subjective judgments cannot dissociate potential effects of response style.
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3.3. Discussion 
In Study 2, we find evidence to support our prediction that Yasawans make harsher 
judgments of negative intent following our Thought Prime’s reminders to think about thoughts. 
The Action Prime, on the other hand, was followed by Yasawans making harsher judgments of 
negative outcomes (esp. accidents vs. failed attempts); replicating the results of study 1. 
However, neither prime appeared to produce a distinct effect among our North American 
participants – perhaps mental states as the causal focus for explaining behaviors is too pervasive 
in North America rendering them immune to this manipulation. It has been similarly difficult to 
experimentally induce North Americans to adequately consider the situation in addition to their 
typical preference for dispositional, trait-based behavioral explanations (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; 
Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999).We do, however, find that North Americans judged 
successful intentional violations as worse than failed attempts following both primes, which does 
not replicate the intent focus observed through harsher judgments of failed attempts from study 
1. Contrary to our prediction, our Action Prime was still followed by North Americans making 
permissibility judgments based primarily upon intent. This may lend further support to previous 
research suggesting that permissibility judgments are especially focused on intent information in 
North America (Cushman, 2008). Our predicted prime effects were only weakly supported in 
North Americans’ judgments about reward or punishment. Though the Action Prime was still 
followed by North Americans making punishment/ reward judgments based on intent, outcome 
information did also influence these judgments. The Thought Prime, on the other hand, was 
followed by reward/ punishment judgments that were primarily influenced by intent.  
Because of the religious framing, one might argue that individual differences in our North 
American participants’ religious beliefs may also have affected the study 2 primes. However, we 
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did not find evidence that the effects of the primes depended on whether individuals self-
identified as religious believers or non-believers, and belief did not predict permissibility or 
punish-worthiness judgments. We also find that there was no significant difference between 
North Americans who were and were not asked about God’s opinions in study 1. As the analysis 
in the supplement section S2.2. shows, differences in personal belief do not appear to sufficiently 
account for the lack of difference in moral judgments between the study 2 primes.  
4. General Discussion 
In study 1, Indigenous iTaukei Fijian participants living in Yasawa, Fiji, who hold Opacity 
of Mind norms that discourage mental state-based behavioral explanations, also focused more on 
negative outcomes than North Americans and other Fijians of Indian descent who do not hold 
Opacity of Mind norms. Our data allows us to contrast judgments of accidents (negative 
outcomes without negative intentions) against failed attempts (negative intentions without 
negative outcomes). Yasawan participants were found to incorporate mental state information via 
intent in their judgments, though they emphasized outcome by judging accidents more harshly. 
Both North American and Indo-Fijian participants, on the other hand, made their judgments 
based primarily on perpetrator intent. Because our Yasawan participants judged bad outcomes 
more harshly while our Indo-Fijian participants did not, it is unlikely that this difference boils 
down to broader global, cross-cultural patterns of collectivism vs. individualism.  
Study 1 results corroborate results found by Barrett and colleagues (2016) and provide 
further evidence against a strong moral intent hypothesis – our evidence does not support the 
notion that intentionality focus is an accessibility universal, equally cognitively available in all 
societies and used for the same purposes in a way that could indicate a species-typical human 
trait (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). Data instead supports a weak moral intent hypothesis, 
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suggesting that intent focus is or can be taken into account in most societies, but the specific 
ways that intent is used vary. This weak moral intent hypothesis does not, however, distinguish 
whether the use of intent information in moral judgements would amount to a functional 
universal (use for the same ends in all societies but different in how readily cognitively available 
it is) or an existential universal (present in all societies but used for different purposes and not 
equally cognitively available in all societies - see Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). We seek to 
provide some evidence to distinguish these possibilities in study 2. 
In Study 2, we examine one mechanism that might drive the cross-societal differences 
shown in study 1: the extent to which thoughts about thoughts are readily available to 
participants when assessing others’ behavior. If intent focus is a matter of how salient thoughts 
are at the time of making a judgment, this would lend support to intent focus as serving the same 
function (a functional universal). When we primed participants to think about thoughts before 
making their moral judgments, Yasawan participants judged the negative intent of failed 
attempts more harshly. This shows that the Yasawans’ outcome focus in study 1 may be a matter 
of salience; living in the context of norms that discourage discussing minds as the causes of 
behavior, our Yasawan participants may have been less likely to automatically think about 
mental states like intention as important sources of information about behavior. When reminded 
to think about thoughts, however, this source of behavioral information becomes more salient 
and intent becomes a more important factor in responding to behavior.  
North American participants, on the other hand, did not show significant differences in 
their judgments following either prime. This is consistent with other work that shows North 
Americans may be less inclined to take the non-mentalistic, situational factors into account when 
explaining behavior, even when explicitly reminded to do so (Choi et al., 1999; Choi & Nisbett, 
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1998). We suggest this may be because North Americans are hypermentalizing, or thinking 
about minds too much, to such an extent that our primes could not influence their judgments 
enough to be measurable in the present data. We further find some limited evidence that North 
American’s permissibility judgments were especially resistant to incorporating outcome 
information. This again would lend support to our claim that the North American model of minds 
as the fundamental source of all action would lead to bad thoughts being more inherently bad 
than bad actions. 
One might argue our observed differences in intent vs. outcome focus have less to do with 
mental state reasoning than the cognitive load Yasawan participants experience from 
unfamiliarity with research tasks. However, we do not find that age or education predict any 
significant differences in judgments across cultural groups in either study 1 or 2. Further, a 
specific difference in cognitive load for Yasawans would not explain the pattern of findings in 
study 2. One might argue that the cognitive load with the prime would be even greater, but we 
find Yasawans do focus in on intent when they are reminded to think about thoughts.  
4.1. Why Reference Minds? Cognitive Efficiency & Relational Mobility 
The current data take the next step beyond documenting cross-societal variation by 
beginning to examine specific aspects of the social norm environment. We find evidence that 
behavioral rules and expectations within social norms can influence decisions in social domains 
beyond the apparent scope of the norm. But why would a norm that discourages talking about 
minds emerge in a society in the first place? We propose two non-exhaustive possibilities: 1) 
cognitive efficiency: a general effect of situations being more determinant of behavior due to a 
context of clearly defined sets of rules and expectations, and 2) relational mobility: a more 
specific effect of highly interdependent, geographically isolated communities where the costs of 
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disagreements with your neighbors are comparatively higher than in societies with more fluid 
social and geographic boundaries.  
4.1.1. Cognitive Efficiency: Tight Behavioral Structuring Reduces Informational Value of 
Mental States 
Mental state inference may only be a useful source of social information within the right 
socio-cultural context. For much of human history, the desires and goals of the community or the 
family have outweighed individual concerns (Brison, 2001; Gelfand et al., 2011; Heine, 2001). 
These community-focused desires and goals are associated with practices and beliefs that 
promote tight group cohesion, distinct group boundaries, and firm adherence to norms. The 
beliefs and behaviors that promote these close-knit communities may themselves stem from 
cultural adaptations to sustain cooperation, especially in situations that pose existential threat 
from harsh environments, disease, or resource scarcity (Bauer, Cassar, Chytilová, & Henrich, 
2014; Botero et al., 2014; Fincher & Thornhill, 2012; Hruschka et al., 2014; Murray, Trudeau, & 
Schaller, 2011; Van de Vliert, 2011). Tight group cohesion and strict norm adherence might be 
especially effective for survival in these situations because a system of clearly defined, widely 
known rules and expectations would reduce the range of choices an individual actor can make 
while simultaneously reducing the effort needed to interpret and respond to those actions. In such 
a system, the valuable time following any given disaster would not be lost in negotiation – 
everyone would already know their roles and responsibilities in responding to the threat. This 
defined situational structure for behavior can then facilitate smoother, more efficient, long-term 
coordination and cooperation (for an example of how norms might facilitate cooperative 
coordination, see: McNamara & Henrich, 2017). Other lines of research also corroborate that 
more community-oriented societies also often pay less attention to intent in their moral 
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judgments (Cohen, 2003; Hamilton et al., 1983; Laurin & Plaks, 2014). Intent may receive less 
emphasis in these societies because norms make the situation such a strong determinant of 
behavior that individual mental states make very little impact on behavior. Personal, internal 
mental states would then be a poor predictor and much harder to infer from the behavioral cues 
available; and thus, a poor use of one’s limited social-cognitive resources.  
A major limitation to this cognitive efficiency explanation is of course that our Indo-Fijian 
sample, who are also more community-oriented than most samples from Western populations, do 
not show the outcome focus that our Indigenous iTaukei Fijian samples do. So, while there may 
be some evidence to support a general effect of communal group orientation relating to tighter 
situational constraints and less reliance on mental state information to predict behavior, 
collectivism/ individualism alone cannot explain the present pattern of findings (Laurin & Plaks, 
2014; Young & Saxe, 2011). We therefore further suggest that there may be some additional 
socio-ecological constraint in some societies that further shapes locally-contingent models of 
mind. We suggest relative isolation, and consequent higher costs of moving away from social 
conflict, may further promote the adaptive benefits of a model of mind that treats minds as 
unknowable.  
4.1.2. Relational Mobility: When Costs of Community Conflict are High, Focus on 
Behavior Promotes Consequentialist Thinking 
What does avoidance of mind talk do for people in societies with Opacity of Mind norms? 
Our data suggest that one result is more outcome-focused, consequentialist patterns of moral 
judgments. By focusing on what can be directly observed in behavior rather than what must 
necessarily be inferred within the unseen realm of mental states, this consequentialist orientation 
might curtail unprovable inferences when it is difficult to move away from social sources of 
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conflict. In societies like our participating Indigenous iTaukei Fijian communities, reliance on 
traditional, communal food production and ownership models, combined with living in relative 
isolation on islands, may increase the costs of not getting along with your neighbor substantially 
more than for societies who rely on more autonomy and who live on larger landmasses with 
more area to disperse over. Opacity of Mind norms have been identified in Pacific Island 
communities like Fiji, Samoa, and among societies in Papua New Guinea9 (Duranti, 2015; 
Robbins & Rumsey, 2008). Other societies that express doubt about the accessibility of others’ 
mental states include highland Maya (Groark, 2008) and nomadic but geographically remote 
Inuit groups in the high arctic (Briggs, 2008). While we caution against lumping all of these 
societies into the same phenomenon, similarities across them may point to a general adaptive 
strategy for dealing with deep social interdependence and steep costs of losing those social 
connections.  
Relational mobility as construed here also has similarities to group entitativity, or the 
extent to which groups are seen as collective wholes and group members seen as interchangeable 
(Lickel, Wieczorkowska, & Lewis, 2000). Groups that are seen as more cohesive wholes by 
outsiders and insiders are more likely to be ascribed collective responsibility and collective 
blame for various actions (Denson, Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, & Ames, 2006; Waytz & Young, 
2012). These perceptions of being a member of a more entity-like, cohesive group may be 
another mechanism driving collectivism and in-group cohesion: experimental inductions of 
uncertainty lead to higher endorsements of group membership in highly entitative groups 
(Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002). Some research of moral reasoning among 
                                                 
9 Though PNG is geographically larger than many Pacific Island nations, its history of cultural and linguistic barriers 
to gene flow make it one of the most genetically diverse countries in the world (Bergström et al., 2017). These 
cultural barriers to mixing across groups also speak to the relative relational immobility among these societies. 
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participants in Hong Kong suggested that people living in a collectivistic, group-oriented 
environment are also more likely to endorse collective responsibility (C. Y. Chiu & Hong, 1992). 
Taken together, group entitativity and collective responsibility may be in part responsible for 
patterns of witchcraft and sorcery concerns in societies with documented Opacity of Mind norms 
within Melanesia. In these societies, illness of protracted length (or one leading to death) is often 
attributed to sorcery or witchcraft by some member of another group. When the sorcery/ 
witchcraft allegation is put forward, individual members of the group may or may not be 
identified. Importantly, the individual’s kin or other focal group has some responsibility for 
delivering the appropriate compensation to the ill or deceased person’s group (Patterson, 1974). 
Cognitive efficiency and relational mobility need not be mutually exclusive mechanisms. 
Living in a society with strict situational guidelines for behavior with more hard-and-fast 
behavioral constraints makes obligation to family and social status a more important determinant 
of action than individual desires and beliefs. Mental state inference can be an effective and 
efficient strategy when individuals are given the autonomy to act according to their own desires 
and goals, because, in such a context, individual behavior is indeed the direct reflection of 
individual desires and goals. However, the need to avoid mental state inference as a potential 
source of conflict is even greater in cases where people depend on each other for basic survival 
and cannot easily remove themselves from a conflict. Thus, the two may both be in operation in 
places with more demonstrable Opacity of Mind norms while cognitive efficiency alone may 
account for broader cross-cultural differences between more autonomous and more mind-focused 
societies vs. more interdependent and more situation-focused societies.  
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4.2. Future Directions 
It is important to note, however, that the previous work on resistance to considering the 
situation in North American samples focused on attributions about stable traits, not transient 
mental states (Malle, 2006). Whether intentions might be thought of in ways similar to or 
different from stable dispositional traits is beyond the scope of the present research. However, 
early social psychology theorists suggested that inferences about actor intent were a core part of 
how people determine behavioral causality (Heider, 1958), and how we build inferences about 
stable, internal dispositions (Jones & Davis, 1966). American children begin to link information 
about repeated and intentional actions into inferences about dispositional traits starting in middle 
childhood (Boseovski, Chiu, & Marcovitch, 2013; Rotenberg, 1980). When no intention 
information is given, American adults will infer an intention based upon previous positive or 
negative experience with that person (Chakroff & Young, 2015; Kliemann, Young, Scholz, & 
Saxe, 2008). Further study is needed to determine if people living in the context of different 
cultural models of mind might spontaneously infer intentions to evaluate behavior and whether 
they might produce different patterns of dispositional attributions.  
While the verbal and self-report accounts people give in Opacity of Mind contexts suggest 
talking about minds is discouraged, it remains unclear how this translates to thinking about 
minds. How, at a cognitive processing level, might such norms influence the ways that people 
track what other agents perceive, desire, and know/ believe? Our study 2 finding that Yasawan 
participants judged outcome less severely when reminded to think about thoughts hints at a 
cross-cultural difference in how often minds are the preferred causal explanation of behavior. We 
suggest this could be the result of lower chronic activation of mind concepts; if the Opacity of 
Mind norms reduce habitual usage of mental states as explanations of behavior, then mental state 
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concepts would be less often activated and therefore less often relied upon to interpret and 
respond to behaviors. From a Western perspective, it is tempting to conclude that this must mean 
that Indigenous iTaukei Fijian culture is suppressing mentalizing. But, it is equally possible that 
Western beliefs, practices, and institutions boost mentalizing. We suggest both may be occurring.  
Another possibility is that both groups think about minds in exactly the same ways, but the 
social acceptability of talking about it makes our results look different. If this is the case, then we 
would expect that our Yasawan participants would have the same initial responses to intention, 
but have to suppress it to reach the outcome-focused responses. One could similarly take the 
opposing prediction, suggesting that North Americans simply suppress the outcome to reach the 
intention-focused response. Similarly, the cognitive processing behind mental state attribution 
could be the same in all cultural contexts – the same informational cues may be attended to and 
used to reach similar conclusions in all contexts – but the link between mental states as the 
causes of behaviors may not be as strong in the Opacity of Mind context. This link between mind 
and behavior may be less salient or even absent all together because other elements of the 
situation are more predictive and therefore better targets of attention when interpreting others’ 
actions. If this is the case, then the existing behavioral measures of Theory of Mind like the False 
Belief task would produce results that look different because participants from Opacity of Mind 
societies would not use mental state information (i.e. the false belief) to provide the behavioral 
prediction (i.e. point to the location where the protagonist will look for the object) that forms the 
core of the task measure. Yet another possibility, stemming from the cognitive efficiency 
hypotheses above, may be that people in Opacity of Mind contexts simply rely more on different 
informational cues – perhaps fully attending to different elements of the situation not present in 
the existing body of research (like kinship relationships or other village-relevant, contextual 
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factors). Future research into what people in different socio-cultural contexts attend to and focus 
on when evaluating behavior can shed further light on how cognitive processes within Theory of 
Mind function, what sorts of cooperative dilemmas they can resolve, and how they may have 
evolved within various cultural configurations over human history. 
Another important future direction for this research lies in assessing how these patterns of 
moral judgment may vary with psychological development. Studies with infants in North 
America show that babies as young as eight months use intent to make socio-moral judgments 
(Hamlin, 2013). Though there is some variation in how old children are when they pass verbal 
theory of mind tests (Barrett, Broesch, Scott, He, Baillargeon, Wu, et al., 2013b; Callaghan et al., 
2005; Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011), North American infants show some 
evidence for thinking about beliefs by their second year of life (Heyes, 2014; Low & Perner, 
2012; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). Taken together, these infant and child studies suggests that 
intentionality reasoning happens early in development and may be a culturally-universal aspect 
of our core cognitive architecture (Woodward, 2009). It remains to be seen whether this focus on 
intent may also be present in cultures that downplay mentalizing, or whether the equivalent focus 
on intent and outcome is present early in life.  
5. Conclusion 
Culturally-transmitted norms that dictate appropriate social behavior and guide our 
interpretations of others’ actions may fundamentally alter the ways we see and interact with the 
world around us. We examined how different norms on thinking about minds lead to intent vs. 
outcome-focused moral reasoning. We further provide data to suggest focus on intent vs. 
outcome may be linked to salience of thoughts when making moral decisions. Because these 
cultural norms may have developed to address specific social and/ or ecological pressures 
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societies face, these norms may have an important role in helping people adapt to various socio-
ecological environments around the world. By linking group-level, culturally-transmitted 
concepts and individual-level cognitive processes, we can further examine how culture may 
tweak minds to suit the constraints of particular environments and social worlds. 
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